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CRITERIA OF PARTNERSHIP.
ALTHOUGH a distinguished writer discourages any attempt to
determine questions of partnership by reference to common principles, yet it will hardly be denied that the tendency of recent
adjudications lies unmistakably in that direction. The doctrine of
Grace v. Smith, 2 W. B1. 998, affirmed in Waugh v. Carver,2 H.
B1. 235 and in many subsequent decisions, has been emphatically
overruled, and the arbitrary notion that a mere participation in the
profits of an undertaking or business created a partnership,
liability as to third persons, has been superseded by the adoption
of a new criterion involving the principle of agency: (ox v.
Hikman, 8 H. L. 0. 268; Bullen v. Sharp, Law Rep. 1

C. P. 85.
Still, it may be doubted even now, whether these decisions
furnish a rule of general application and utility. For if, as Lord
WENSLEYDALE observed in Cox v. Hickman, "the maxim that he
who takes the profits ought to bear the loss, is only the consequence and not the cause why a man is made liable as a partner,"
it might, at least, with some semblance of reason, be said that the
mutual relation of principal and agent results from the fact of
partnerships, which is first to be proved, but does not give existtence to that fact. "I do not think it proper for us to inquire,"
said Mr. Justice BLACKBURN in .Bullen v. Sharp, "whether this
rule of law is more or less expedient than the rule laid down in
Waugh v. Carver. That is a question for the legislature, who
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may alter the law as to them seems best." And subsequently the
statute 28 & 29 Vict. c. 86 was enacted, sanctioning the ratio
decidendi of Cox v. HUickman, and defining specifically what conditions should be held not to constitute the liability of a partner.
The want of scientific certainty and uniformity in the older
resolutions on this subject, is doubtless the result of misdirected
inquiry as to the perception of profits, instead of seeking out the
actual contract of the parties as the true foundation of their
liability. For a contract either express or implied, is in fact the
only just criterion, whether we regard the intentions or the legal
liability of the parties, and unless the circumstances of the case
are such as to warrant the presumption or to prove the fact of an
agreement, there can be no obligation because there is really
nothing to originate it. A contract being thus the proper subject
of investigation, we have no other guidance than that which is
furnished by the doctrines of the common law. For, in the language of Mr. Parsons, "as a very large part of commercial
business consists in forming and executing contracts which must
be governed by the law of contracts generally-and this is a part
of the common law-many of the principles applicable to partnership are the same as those which regulate the common transactions of men; and so far the law of partnership may be said to
be founded upon the common law."
But is it true that any other principles than those which govern
contracts generally ought to be applied in seeking-to fix upon a
person suspected of being a partner, a liability which he has not
expressly undertaken? For as early as 1795, in a case where the
partners were known to the creditor, it was said that "notwithstanding where the person bringing the action has looked to the
faith of several partners, who are in business together, and has
relied upon their joint credit, though but one only of the partnel's
acted, the proof of the act of one shall charge them all; yet it
must be made out in an action at common law that such debt or
contract was joint, before the otherpartners shall be charged. For
in assumpsit against several a joint debt or contract must be
proved; otherwise the proof would not correspond with the declaration :" Watson on Part. (ed. 1795), 59; Layfield's Case, 1
Salk. 292; 1 Esp. N. P. 267.
The cases in which the want of some definite and general test
is most seriously felt, are those where there is no formal agree-
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ment among the parties to be partners, but where they do in fact
contract to share a joint or common benefit, and there is a
question whether the agreement, such as it is, actually constitutes
them partners inter se.In cases of secret, silent, dormant or unknown partners, who
agree in the common characteristic of secrecy or concealment in
respect to creditors of the firm, the only inquiry is as to the
person, and not whether he is a partner or not, for this he is
already, ex hypothesi.
On the other hand, where a person so acts as to induce the
belief that he is already jointly bound with those who seek and
obtain the credit, as in the case of nominal, public or ostensible
partners, it seems hardly necessary to call in aid the principle of
agency in order to determine their liability. For example, if in
the firm A., B. and C., A. and B. are acting partners, and C. a
mere nominal partner, it would appear that C. is responsible to
the partnership creditor, not because A. or B. may have contracted a debt as his agent, but because C., by appearing in the
firm, addresses himself directly to the creditor who is thereupon
authorized to clothe him with the full character of an original
and immediate contractor. He is not a partner merely because
A. or B. may subject him to a joint obligation with themselves,
but because by knowingly permitting his name to appear in the
firm, he thereby expressly constitutes himself a partner, or
rather is estopped from denying that he is a partner, and thus
being a partner any member of the firm may bind him as an
agent. Here it is only necessary to prove that he was knowingly
represented as a member of the firm, without reference to any
agreement made with his copartners. But in the case of one suspected of being a partner, the proof is entirely different, and it is
not only admissible but necessary to resort to the common law for
the means of establishing the fact of partnership, which being
done, the law-merchant comes in to supply the consequences of
that relation.
Let us endeavor then to ascertain among the doctrines of
the common law, the ultimate principle on which the joint
liability of joint contractors is founded, and see if it may not
be made serviceable in determining the partnership relation
in respect to the creditor. For it must be remembered that we
are now called upon to prove the fact of partnership, in the
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absence of any express agreement to that effect, and perhaps in
the face of a denial made under the solemn sanction of an oath.
It is therefore requisite to prove a joint liability between the
party sought to be charged and the party or parties already
known to be liable for the debt. And this can be done only by
showing that the relations of all the parties to the creditor are
identical.
The common law enables us to ascertain this identity of relation by the application of its most familiar elementary principles.
And first there must be a contract.
It may be said generally that wherever the common law gives
a remedy for enforcing the payment of money-except in actions
ex delicto-the right to recover is predicated on the existence of
a contract either express or implied. In actions of debt, covenant
and assumpsit, it is absolutely indispensable to prove that the
parties agreed together either in formal terms or by intendment
of law, before the defendant shall be required to disprove the
allegations of the plaintiff. And certainly because a man is supposed or charged to be a partner, there is no reason either in law
or in justice to subject him to harder conditions than those which
obtain in ordinary cases, so as to render him liable on a contract
which as to him has no existence either actual or presumptive.
Having established the contract (supposing a consideration
proven) the question next in importance is who are answerable
for its fulfilment, or rather for damages, in default of its fulfilment, in other words, who are properly defendants to the action?
And here it is manifest that no one ought to be made a defendant
who was not a party to the contract either in person or by representation lawfully authorized. Where the contract is express, there
is no difficulty in determining the question ; but where it is implied,
it is necessary to ascertain where the legal liability rests, for
where this is found, then the presence of a contract is presumed.
But no one can enforce this liability to whom it is not directly given.
for 11it is a general rule that no person can maintain this action
(assumpsit) on an agreement to which he is not a party, for in such
case there can be no contract express or implied," 1 Str. 592.
Nor is there any magic virtue in the lex gnercatoria,which can convert a stranger into a party simply because he happens to be called
a partner by those whose interest it is to prove that he is such.
The real question then is, did the supposed partner contract
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with the partnership creditor ? and in the absence of any express
agreement, the law will infer a contract from certain facts and
circumstances.
When A. at his request, either express or implied, obtains the
goods of C. without agreeing as to the price or actually promising
to pay it, the law imposes on him the obligation of a contract to
pay so much as they are worth, and the grouna of his liability is'
the benefit to himself and the corresponding detriment to C. The
same is true if A. and B. obtain goods in a similar manner, each
one at common law being liable for the whole debt, with the right
of demanding contribution.
But the benefit must move immediately from C. to A. or to A.
and B., and not through an intermediate interest or title, for
otherwise the assumpsit cannot be implied, but must be expressly
given. For instance, if A. assumes the responsibility of a debt
contracted by B., for B.'s benefit, the law can raise no implied
undertaking from A. to the creditor, whatever may be the consideration as between A. and B., but goes so far as to require
that the promise shall be in writing. The liability of the guarantor is essentially different from that of the principal debtor, and
depends upon a totally different principle. For here in fact are
two contracts; the debtor's contract to pay for the goods, and the
guarantor's undertaking to pay the debt in default of payment
by the principal debtor. As to the contract to pay for the goods,
there is no privity between the guarantor and the creditor, and
the only effect of the statute 29 Car. I. c. 8 is that such collateral agreements are now required to be in writing, in order that
the guarantee may be more readily proven, but it does not merge
the two contracts into one.
So if A. purchases goods on credit and then gives or sells them
to B., although the latter has the use and benefit of the property
so obtained, yet the creditor cannot go around his immediate
debtor and charge the debt upon a stranger, because here is an
intermediate title or ownership, and there is ea vi terminorum, no
privity and consequently no contract between the stranger and
the creditor.
The ground of the implied contract is therefore the benefit
drawn directly1 from the use of the goods or property purchased,
which property has been received immediately from the creditor
in such a manner as to create a privity of relationship between
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the debtor and himself; and what is true of one, holds equally
good of any number of debtors.
This general reasoning is applicable to all cases of supposed
partnership, where an attempt is made to extend the liability
beyond its ostensible limits. The problem with the defence is to
fix the point at which the liability ceases, for it must cease when
no contract can be legally presumed or proven to exist, and if it
can be shown to fall short of the person sought to be charged by
being intercepted in some intermediate party, it follows necessarily
that the former cannot be affected by it.
A community of interest in the profits of a joint undertaking
or business is sdid to be essential to the existence of a partnership; but this is true only so far as the mainer in which the
profits are taken serves to evidence and explain the contract
between the parties. Profits being therefore the proper subject
of partnership property, it is only requisite to inquire into the
mode of participation, in order to determine whether the party
interested is a partner or not. Suppose C. is suspected of being
a partner with A. and B., by what proof is the fact established?
A mere participation in the profits is not alone sufficient to charge
him, for the mode of participation may be such as to prove directly
the contrary. It must be shown that the supposed partner is in
the same relation to the creditor that the known partners are;
that is, they must all be immediate debtors to the partnershipcreditor for a joint benefit conferred simultaneously and directly
upon them by the creditor. A. and B. are liable because they have
received a benefit directly from the use of the creditor's property;
and inasmuch as it is a joint benefit derived from a joint use and
disposition of that property, the law attaches to them the joint
liability of partners which, ex lhypothesi, they have expressly
assumed. Hence if C. can be shown to have a similar interest in
the profits and thereby to sustain a similar relation to the creditor,
it follows, as a matter of cours'e, that lie is liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as the other partners are, and is
himself a partner. In other words, the supposed partner must
have the same privity of relation to the creditor that all the other
partners have. And hence instead of saying "1that he who shares
in profits indefinitely, is liable as a partner to creditors, because he
takes from that fund which is the proller securityl to them for the
pa/rnient of their debts ;" it seems more accurate to say-be-
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cause by having in the profits an interest similar in characterto
that of the other partner or partners, he has enjoyed a benefit conferred directly upon him by the creditor, and thereby through an
implied contract, becomes as much his debtor, as the party or parties
already known to be so indebted.
How, then, is this privity to be ascertained? We answer-by
showing that the profits are derived from a joint benefit moving
immediately from the creditor to all the parties to be charged ; or
what is the same thing, by proving that the interest of the party
who ostensibly receives and the interest of the party who actually
shares the benefit or profits, are homogeneous;* that is, subsisting in the same right and in the same subject-matter. Otherwise
the contract cannot be presumed as between the supposed partner
and the partnership-creditor.
The view here taken justifies the reasoning of Lord ELDON in
.Exparte Hamper, 17 Yes. 404, where he makes a distinction between a stipulation for a proportion of the profits as a compensation for labor, skill or services, and an agreement to receive a
sum of money equal to such a proportion of the profits and
actually paid out of them ; holding that the former constituted a
partnership and the latter did not. And the distinction is obvious notwithstanding Mr. Justice BRAMWELL thought there was no
"difference except in words, at least so far as creditors are con.
cerned :" Bullen v. Sharp, ubi sup. 126. The real difference
consists in the different legal consequences of the two contracts.
Where the agreement is to receive a proportion of the profits in
consideration of services, these latter are to be regarded as component parts of the partnership stock belonging to, and being
under the control of the firm, and the party who contributes
them is thereby made a partner, in the absence of any special
restriction to the contrary. While he labors to produce profits
for others, he is at the same time producing them for himself and
thus he has the same interest in his own services, as if he contributed only money to the partnership stock and bore his share
of the expense which the firm would have to incur if -it employed
I The words homogeneous and homogeneity strike us as far more accurate and convenient expressions for indicating the interest of partners than the words common

and community, which are usually employed for that purpose. This may have been
the idea of Mr. Parsons when he said I the distinction taken is between different
kinds of interests in or claims upon profits :" Pars. Part. 75, in note.
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the labors of a hired servant, instead of his own. Moreover he
derives his interest directly from the joint use of the partnership
stock and is therefore an immediate debtor to the partnership
creditor. But where it is expressly agreed that a sum of money
equal to a proportion of the profits shall be paid as a reward for
services, the very words forbid the supposition of a partnership
and merely provide a contingent measurement for the compensation to be paid, the payee not sharing the direct use and control
of the partnership property, but receiving his interest through an
intermediate party in whom the ownership had previously vested.
And here we have an illustration of Mr. Parsons' favorite criterion
of " ownership in the profits before they are divided" deduced
from a rule which he himself denies.
But our conclusion as to the necessity of homogeneity in the
interests of the parties as above explained, in order to create the
partnership relation as to third persons as well as inter se, is only
the ultimate development of the reasoning upon which the case
of Cox v. Hickman was decided. That case was substantially
as follows: a manufacturing concern being heavily indebted conveyed all their property to trustees to carry on the business and
out of the profits to pay off the debts. The trustees, in process
of time, became involved, and their creditors attempted to fix a
joint liability with the trustees upon the other creditors because
they received the profits. But every consideration of common
sense and common justice plainly urged the repudiation of a rule
which led to so absurd a consequence, and the court realizing the
necessity of finding some escape from its extravagant conclusions,
boldly renounced and attacked the rule itself, holding that inasmuch as the trustees could not be regarded technically as the agents
of the first creditors in contracting the subsequent liabilities, no
partnership existed between them.
The necessity of founding the partnership liability upon a direct
and immediate contract with the creditor, is thus distinctly recognised. The party to be charged must be shown to have made a
contract, and if it does not appear that he contracted in person,
the next inquiry naturally and logically is, did he make the
contract through an agent? If neither, then he is not liable as a
partner.
So there must be an identity of relation between the supposed
partners in respect to the creditor, and hence the newly adopted
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rule requires that the relation of principal and agent shall be
mutual, so that the contract of one shall be the contract of both.
Whether the party actually contracting should be regarded as
an agent quoad hoc is a question not more easily answered in
many cases than the question of partnership itself, and herein, if
anywhere, the insufficiency of the rule is exposed.
Reasoning upon the principles which we have contended for
above, in their application to the case in question, it would appear
that the relation of the first creditors and that of the trustees to
the subsequent creditors were entirely different, and the difference
is too obvious to be specifically pointed out. The legal title and
actual ownership of the profits was in the trustees intervening
between them and the first creditors, and so the legal ownership
of the profits was likewise in the trustees, before they were
actually paid over to the beneficiaries under the deed. There
was no immediate relation or privity, and consequently no contract between the first and second creditors because the benefit
conferred by the subsequent creditors did not move directly but
inediately through the trustees, to the former creditors. The
interest of the first creditors and that of the trustees not being
homogeneous, the relation of partnership did not. exist between
them.
As a matter of course, many of the old adjudications will be
found erroneous in the light of these later decisions, but it is useless to go into a consideration of them. Mr. Parsons, after citing
numerous cases, admits the very manifest " difficulty, if not impossibility, of drawing from the decisions any definite principle,
or rule applicable with certainty to the question, who are partners
as to third persons ?"
All the cases where there is no express contract of partnership
among the parties, may be reduced to the following formula:A contract between A. and B., 0., having a legal claim against
A., assumes that B. is subject to the same liability by reason of his
contract with A.:
In construing the agreement between A. and B., the real question is, whether or not it raises the presumption of a contract between B. and 0. According to the rule of Cox v. Hickman, it
must appear that A. was the agent of B. in contracting the debt
to 0., and the agency is sufficiently proven by showing th'at the
trade carried on by A. was in fact carried on in behalf of A. and
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B. We think the proposition is better stated thus :-A. being
indebted to C. for a benefit moving directly and simultaneously
from C. to A. and B., the same cause which makes A. a debtor
necessarily makes B. a debtor also, and therefore they are partners.
In iesketh v. Blanchard,4 East 144, Lord ELLENBO1OUGH
held, in accordance with the prevailing doctrines on the subject,
that a man might be a partner as to third persons, though so far
from being a partner with his immediate contractor, that he might
bring an action against him on their contract. This class of cases
is thus disposed of by BRAMWELL, J., in Bullen v. Sharp, ubi
sup. 124 :-" Partnership means a certain relation between two
parties. How, then, can it be correct to say that A. and B. are
not in partnership as between themselves, they have not held
themselves out as being so, and yet a third person has a right to
say they are so as relates to him? But that must mean inter se, for
partnership is a relation inter se, and the word cannot be used
except to signify that relation." Now the " relation inter se"
must always depend upon the contract inter se, and this must
place the parties in the same relation to the creditor, for otherwise A.'s contract with C. cannot be B.'s contract with C.
There is a class of cases where the contract between A. and
B. (adopting the foregoing formula) is one of bargain and sale,
and the stipulation for profits is only intended to designate a
mode of paying the price. The case of the bargain for a house*
stated by Mr. Parsons is one of this kind, and shows to what
extravagant lengths the rule of Waugh v. Carver may be carried.
The idea of a partnership between A. and B. on such a contract
as this, we venture to say, would never have entered any reasonable mind that was not misled and prejudiced by the unwarranted
significance which the word profits gradually acquired on the
authority of judicial interpretation.
The case of Barry v. .Neslzam, 6 C. B. 641, may be cited as
IIftwo men were bargaining for a house and the seller says your business is
so prosperous, you can afford to pay me all I ask; and the buyer replies, you mistake, the profits of my business are not so large as you think; and the seller
rejoins, well, I will, at all events, take one-fourth of your next year's profits for
the house, and a written contract is executed on these terms, it would be simply
absurd to contend that this sale of a house made the seller liable for all the business
debts of the buyer: Pars. on Part. 71.
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an illustration, and the following arrangement will simplify the
meaning of the contract.
1. There was a sale of a newspaper by B. to A. for 15001.,
payable in seven annual instalments; 2. B. guaranteed A. a clear
annual profit of 1501. ; 3. A. agreed in consideration thereof to
pay B. all the profits in excess of the 1501., until they reached
the sum of 5001.; 4. If the surplus profits should amount to
5001. during the seven years the instalments had to run, then A.
agreed to pay in addition to what he had already promised, the
existing liabilities of the paper, not exceeding 2501. ; 5. B. should
receive such surplus profits only until they amounted to 5001.;
6. A. might pay off all the purchase-money, assume all the liabilities of the paper, and become entitled to all the profits at any
time; 7. B. might withdraw his guaranty of 1501. at any time.
The question was whether B. was liable as a partner for goods
supplied to the newspaper on A.'s order, and the court held that
he was, on the ground that he was still the owner of the paper, and
participatedin the profits, as stated in the opinion of MAULE, J.
Now, if B. continued to own the paper there can be no doubt
of his liability for its debts; but whether as a partner or not, is
another question. For if there was no sale, A. was in fact
nothing more than a "salaried agent receiving a definite sum out
of the profits as a compensation for services, and in this case he
could have no interest in the surplus profits. But it seems that
there was a sale, that all the subsequent stipulations had reference only to the mode of payment, and that the surplus profits
did. actually go to help pay what A. owed B. Nor was payment
confined to profits alone, for A. might at any time have paid the
whole price and become entitled to all the profits, or B. might
have withdrawn the guarantee, and in either case there would
have remained a simple undisguised contract of bargain and sale.
It was not even a conditional sale, for B. retained no ownership
in or claim upon the newspaper, nor was there a provision that he
should take it back in any contingency.
If he was a partner then, it was because of the agreement
that a third of the debt (5001.) might possibly be paid out of
profits, and we say possibly, for this part of the agrbement might
have been rescinded. Was the mode of participation viewed in
connection with all the circumstances, such as to constitute a
partnership between A. and B. ? We conclude that it was not,
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and we do so with the less hesitation because the decision of thi
case was expressly founded on the principle of Wraugh v. Carver.
WIGHTMAN, J., in Cox v. Hickman, said: "I greatly.doubt
whether the creditor who merely obtains payment of a debt
incurred in the business by being paid the exact amount of his
debt and no more, out of the profits of the business, can be said
to share the profits ;" and the proposition that if one "limits his
claim to be paid out of profits only, his limited right to payment
creates an unlimited liability" was pronounced by POLLOCK, 0. B.,
in another case, "unjust, absurd and at -variance with natural
equity." These dicta seem to settle the rule which governs
such cases. Here B. was in fact a creditor, not of the supposed
firm, but of A. individually; the debt was not even "incurred
in," but was preliminary to, the business, and the application
of profits being for the payment of an existing debt, there was
not such a participation as to establish the relation of partners,
between A. and B.
Applying our own reasoning to the case, it appears that the
interests of the parties in the profits were not homogeneous, for
all the profits belonged primarily and exclusively to A., as the
fruit of his own capital and labor. B.'s interest in the profits-if he can be said to have an interest therein-was the result of a
distinct and independent contract with A. and not of any implied
contract with A.'s creditor. Under the existing agreement B.
had no lien on the profits, but only a right of action against A.
for so much as they were worth; consequently these interests did
not subsist in the same right or necessarily in the same subjectmitter, and therefore there was no partnership between them.
There is a class of cases where the contract between A. and B.
is continuous on both sides and contains a provision for the continued payment of profits. Here, as in other cases, the relation
of the parties must be gathered from the whole contract, and not
postulated by mere force of the word profits.
In .Exparte Langdale, 18 Yes. 300 (in terms of the formula),
it appears that A., the bankrupt, had kept a canteen, and that B.
was a manufacturer of beer. The statements of the parties were
conflicting: A. represented that half his shop-rent was paid by
B. in consideration of A.'s paying him 17s. per barrel of beer
out of the profits. B. stated that he paid half the shop-rent and
A. in consideration thereof paid him 41. 5s. per barrel for beer,

